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The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority
Requirement and Transnational Class
Actions: Excluding Foreign Class
Members in Favor of European
Remedies
By MICHAEL P. MURTAGH
I. Introduction
Much recent discussion of transnational litigation has focused on
"foreign-cubed" securities class actions and whether they fall within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts.' In foreign-
cubed class actions, foreign purchasers of the stock of a foreign
company who purchased their stock on a foreign exchange bring class
actions in federal court for violation of U.S. securities laws.2 These
foreign-cubed cases, and indeed, all class actions containing
. Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. J.D., University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, 2010; LL.M., Central European University, 2007; B.A.,
University of California, Santa Barbara, 2006. The views expressed here are solely
those of Michael Murtagh. This Article was written during the course of the Spring
2010 Class Actions Seminar at University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
taught by the Honorable A. James Robertson II of the San Francisco Superior Court.
Thank you to Judge Robertson for providing very helpful comments and guidance,
and Valentina Bratu for support and inspiration. Thank you as well to the editors of
the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review for your hard work in
editing this piece.
1. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Australian Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)
(holding that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act applies only to "transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities . . . .");
Christine Seib & Alex Spence, US Supreme Court Ruling on 'Cubed Case' Could
Scare Off Foreign Companies, THE TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), available at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article7O79461.ece; John C. Coffee,
Securities Policeman To the World? The Cost Of Global Class Actions, NEW YORK
LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 18, 2008, at 5, col.1; George Conway, III, The Rise and
(Coming) Fall of 'F-Cubed' Securities Litigation, 9 ENGAGE 33 (2008).
2. See supra note 1.
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multinational classes and/or foreign defendants,3 pose significant
problems for the U.S. federal courts. This Article focuses on the
difficult issues these transnational class actions pose at the class
certification stage of a lawsuit.4
Perhaps not surprisingly, transnational class actions, despite their
reliance on U.S. law, have forced federal courts to decide difficult
questions of foreign law. When deciding motions for class
certification, courts have considered whether the courts of foreign
countries would recognize the class action judgment in order to
prevent two undesirable scenarios: (1) the plaintiff wins the suit or
settles in the U.S. and tries to enforce the judgment abroad, but the
foreign court does not recognize the judgment; (2) the defendant wins
the suit in the U.S. (or, absent parties do not like the outcome of a
suit or settlement), and members of the class pursue the same claim
abroad.! This inquiry, which has been conducted as part of the Rule
23(b)(3) superiority inquiry, leads courts to consider whether the
courts of other nations would give preclusive effect to the judgment.
If not, courts have sometimes excluded plaintiffs from those countries
from the class.'
This Article proceeds as follows. In Section II, this Article first
discusses the reasons why foreign courts may not recognize an opt-out
class action judgment. Next, it critically examines the way that U.S.
district courts have determined whether foreign courts would give res
judicata effect to a class action judgment. It argues that the current
solution has generally worked well when it is clear whether a foreign
court would give res judicata effect to the judgment, but that it has
needlessly exposed the parties (mostly the defendant) to unnecessary
risks in cases where the foreign law is unclear on the res judicata
effect to be given to a class action judgment. It then discusses
3. These types of cases will often be referred to as "transnational class actions"
in this Article. See Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554472.
4. See Coffee, supra note 1 (discussing this avenue for challenging foreign-cubed
class actions).
5. See Hannah Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14,31 (2007).
6. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76,
95 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Coffee, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 105-06 (excluding German and Austrian
class members).
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important considerations in crafting a solution and critiques other
proffered solutions.
In Section III, this Article first advocates for the exclusion of
foreign class members from opt-out class actions where it is unclear
whether the foreign courts would give res judicata effect to the
judgment. This solution excludes foreign class members from
recovering via a Rule 23(b)(3) class action and forces them to pursue
remedies in their home countries.! It is a clear, predictable, and
efficient rule that would end the excessive litigation over future res
judicata effect and the inconsistent results it has caused for foreign
companies facing lawsuits in the U.S.
This Article next argues that exclusion of foreign class members
is further justified in light of the growing body of effective means of
resolving mass claims in Europe. This Article will briefly highlight
the Dutch Collective Settlement Act of 2005, model case procedures
in Germany and Austria, and group litigation orders in the United
Kingdom as potential justifications for courts to exclude foreign class
members. Because of the ease of recognizing judgments between
European countries, European remedies should be considered
"superior" to U.S. remedies when classes consist of European
plaintiffs and there is a dispute about the res judicata effect of an
American judgment. The Amsterdam Court of Appeals recent
approval of the settlement of European claims in the Dutch Shell
litigation hints at how this remedy may work in practice. Finally, this
Article briefly discusses the impact of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Morrison v. National Australian Bank, dispels possible
counterarguments, and concludes.
II. Certifying Transnational Class Actions
This Article focuses on transnational class actions brought under
8. Or, as will be discussed infra, some European plaintiffs may recover under
the Dutch Collective Settlement Act. See infra Section III.C.; see also In re Royal
DutchlShell Transp. Sec. Litig. (Dutch Shell II), 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 723-24 (D.N.J.
2007) ("The Court also emphasizes that this holding does not leave the Non-U.S.
Purchasers without an alternative recourse to address their alleged injuries.
Significantly, the Non-U.S. Purchasers can seek recovery through the Settlement
Agreement entered into before the Amsterdam Court of Appeals or through
procedures available within their respective jurisdictions.").
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 9 In order to be certified,
these actions must fulfill both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).'0 As will
be shown below, while most of these requirements tend to prove
unproblematic, the superiority requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) is more
controversial." This Section discusses the issues foreign classes raise
at the class certification stage, analyzes the judicial treatment of the
superiority inquiry in cases with foreign classes, and discusses
important considerations in solving the problems raised by the
superiority inquiry.
A. Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance1 2
As a threshold matter, Rule 23(a) is usually easily satisfied in
transnational class actions. Rule 23(a) requires a finding of
numerosity, commonality, adequacy, and typicality." While not
explicitly stated in the rule, courts also require that there be an
ascertainable class and that the plaintiff must be a member of it.14
Numerosity is usually unproblematic because many of these
transnational class actions are securities fraud class actions involving
many claims and class members in multiple countries; thus, it would
be impracticable to bring all claimants before the court." The
commonality requirement is also generally met because the plaintiffs
all seek relief based on the same allegedly fraudulent acts or
* * 16
omissions."
Typicality and adequacy under Rule 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4) deal
with the qualifications of the named plaintiff: so long as the plaintiff's
9. See, e.g., Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. 76 (foreign-cubed claim).
10. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; Daniel Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: FLSA
Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 275,288 (2009).
11. See, e.g., Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 102; Coffee, supra note 1 (discussing the
superiority requirement and foreign-cubed class actions).
12. These requirements are briefly, but not exhaustively, analyzed here because
this Article focuses primarily on the superiority requirement in Rule 23(b)(3), which
is where transnational class actions have historically posed problems.
13. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
14. See Lopez, supra note 10, at 287-88 (citing 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1759, at 117 (3d ed. 2005)).
15. See, e.g., Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 84; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at §
1781.1.
16. For example, in Vivendi I, 242 F.R.D. at 84, the defendants did not dispute
the existence of many common questions.
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counsel picks class representatives with claims typical of the class,"
who can adequately represent the claims of the absent members,
these requirements are not especially problematic in cases with
foreign class members. Some cases have considered whether a
foreign plaintiff can be a lead plaintiff, and in those cases defendants
have argued with some success that a foreign plaintiff would not be an
appropriate lead plaintiff because that plaintiff's country might not
give res judicata effect to the judgment." With a class of foreign
purchasers, there are usually also foreign class representatives,
helping to satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements."
Assuming Rule 23(a) is satisfied, Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
inquiry also poses no special problems in transnational class actions
because many of these transnational class actions involve securities
fraud claims.20 Predominance is easily satisfied in securities fraud
class actions because plaintiffs may rely on either the Basic v.
Levinson21 presumption or the Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
17. See, e.g., Robidoux ex rel. Rock v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936-37 (2d Cir. 1993)
("When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both
the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement
is usually met irrespective of minor variations in the fact patterns underlying
individual claims.").
18. See, e.g., Buettgen v. Harless, 263 F.R.D. 378, 382-83 (N.D. Tex. 2009), where
the court held that a Swiss plaintiff was not the most adequate plaintiff because it
would be subject to unique defenses, namely, that a Swiss court would not recognize
the class action judgment. Id. But see Mohanty v. Big Band Networks, Inc., No. 07-
5101 SBA, (Docket Nos. 12, 15, 43], 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32764, at *19-25 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (declining to rebut Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's
most adequate plaintiff presumption based on mere speculation that courts of Cyprus
would not recognize class action judgment). This issue is generally outside the scope
of this Article, which assumes that Rule 23(a) has been met and considers the impact
of foreign courts not recognizing a judgment in the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority context.
However, the solution advocated infra Section III would eliminate these problems.
19. See, e.g., Vivendi I, 242 F.R.D. at 85-87.
20. "Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging ... securities
fraud.... " Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 23 advisory committee's note); see also ROBERT H. KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS
ACrIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION CASES AND MATERIALS 260-61 (2d
ed. 2005) (discussing Basic presumption).
21. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). Under Basic, provided that
certain features of the market are present, the court presumes reliance in purchasing,
which frees the plaintiffs from having to individually prove reliance. Id.; see also
KLONOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 261.
2011] 5
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United States22 presumption to prevent the individualized nature of
proving reliance from outweighing the common issues present. Thus,
the prospective plaintiff seeking certification of securities class actions
with foreign class members generally encounters little difficulty
outside of the superiority requirement, which will be treated
separately below.
B. The Superiority Requirement
The main battleground for certification of transnational class
actions has been Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement.3 The
argument against certification is that the class action is not superior to
other methods of adjudicating the dispute because foreign courts may
not recognize the judgment.24 This Subsection will first discuss the
reasons why foreign courts may not recognize a class action judgment,
and then discusses the way that courts have treated Rule 23(b)(3)'s
superiority requirement in transnational class actions, highlighting the
implications of a conflict between two recent cases in the Southern
District of New York.
1. Brief Overview of Reasons Why a Foreign Court Might Not
Enforce a Class Action Judgment
Before discussing the judicial treatment of the superiority issue,
one must first understand the reasons why foreign courts might not
recognize an opt-out class action judgment. Under Rule 23(b)(3), any
member of a class who wishes to do so may opt-out of the class upon
receiving notice." If they do not opt-out, they are bound by the
22. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); see also
KLONOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 261.
23. See, e.g., George Bermann, U.S. Class Actions and the Global Class, 19 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 94-95 (2009); Matthew H. Jasilli, Note, A Rat Res? Questioning
the Value of Res Judicata in Rule 23(b) (3) Superiority Inquiries for Foreign Cubed
Class Action Securities Litigations: Philippe S.E. Schreiber Student Writing Prize in
Comparative and International Law, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 114, 117 (2009);
Ilana Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized
Economy - Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in
the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1572 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 32.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the
court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort.").
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judgment or settlement.26  This system stands in stark contrast to
methods of collective redress around the world. For example, many
European Member States have no such collective redress system, let
alone one with an opt-out model.27
Opt-out class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) differ from their
foreign counterparts not only in practice, but perhaps more
importantly, in underlying theory. While "[t]he opt-out procedure
relies on the theory of constructive notice,. .. other systems start
from the principle that absent class members who have not had actual
notice of the litigation, and who did not participate in that litigation,
cannot be bound by its outcome." 28  Because of this significant
difference, "[s]ome commentators have observed that U.S.-style class
actions could not be implemented in Europe because opt-out based
group actions would violate the due process rights of European
citizens and are incompatible with such constitutionally guaranteed
principles as the right to be heard and the right of the parties to
control the proceedings."29 The problem with opt-out class actions is
not only that they are uncommon in Europe, but also that the very
premise of an opt-out class action - that one's interests can be
bindingly resolved without them ever being present in the lawsuit or
affirmatively participating - conflicts with some of the most important
underlying premises of other legal systems. One commentator
described opt-out class actions as "an anathema" in the eyes of
Europeans."
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(vii); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); Lopez, supra
note 10, at 286; Joshua D. Stadtler, Note, Ortiz Got It Wrong: Why the Seventh
Amendment Does Not Protect the Right to Jury Trial in Class Action Suits Under
FRCP 23, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1561,1575 (2010).
27. Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European
Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409,415 (2009);
Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 32; Laurel Harbour & Natasha Northrip, Class Action
Climate Change in the United States and Europe, THE 12TH ANNUAL NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONs F-23, F-32 (2008) (observing that only the Netherlands
and Portugal have a collective action with an opt-out mechanism); In re Vivendi
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi II), No. 02 Civ. 5571 (RJH) (HBP), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2009) (discussing the Netherlands,
Canadian provinces, Portugal, Finland, and Norway).
28. Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 32; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REv. 179,202 (2009).
29. Harbour & Northrip, supra note 27, at F-31 to -32.
30. Mulheron, supra note 27, at 412.
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The controversy surrounding opt-out class actions makes the
issue of their recognition abroad especially significant. Whereas the
judgments of state or federal courts in the U.S. are entitled to full
faith and credit in other domestic courts,3 this is not the case when
foreign courts consider whether to enforce judgments purporting to
bind absent class members.32 The crucial differences between
American class actions and the legal systems of other countries lead
to a risk of the judgment not being recognized because "[v]irtually all
countries,... reserve the right to refuse enforcement of judgments
that violate local public policy."33  Indeed, foreign courts closely
scrutinize and decline to enforce U.S. judgments - particularly class
action judgments - on public policy groundsj because our opt-out
class actions offend the public policies of many countries.
Both parties, but especially the defendant, are concerned with
the res judicata effect of a class action judgment. While foreign
defendants with enough contacts with the U.S. to support jurisdiction
tend to also have assets in the U.S. sufficient to support the
enforcement of a judgment in the U.S., obviating the need for
enforcement abroad,6
Whether it wins or loses on the merits, [a defendant] has a distinct
and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by
res judicata just as [the defendant] is bound. The only way a class-
action defendant ... can assure itself of this binding effect of the
judgment is to ascertain that the forum court has jurisdiction over
every plaintiff whose claim it seeks to adjudicate, sufficient to
support a defense of res judicata in a later suit for damages by class
members.3 7
When nonrecognition of a judgment is a real possibility, foreign class
members have little incentive to opt out of a class action. In the event
31. Janet Walker, Multi-Jurisdictional and Cross-Border Class Actions:
Symposium Issue: Cross-Border Class Actions: A View From Across the Border, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 755, 760 (2004) (discussing Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985)).
32. Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 32.
33. Id.
34. Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1567, 1578.
35. Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 32.
36. Id. at 31; Frederick K. Jeunger, Symposium Article: A Hague Judgments
Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 114 (1998).
37. Walker, supra note 31, at 763 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at
805).
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they do not like the result of the litigation in the U.S., they may get a
"second bite at the apple" in foreign courts if foreign courts decline to
recognize the judgment.38 At the same time, if plaintiffs win the suit
and the defendant has sufficient assets in the U.S., plaintiffs may
enforce the judgment in the U.S. Thus, foreign class members who
are fortunate enough to have their grievances with foreign companies
that have sizeable assets in the U.S. enjoy the benefits of U.S. law if
they win, but may also sue under their own law if they lose. However,
defendants may have to defend the whole case again if the judgment
is not recognized abroad. This is an inequitable result for defendants,
who are unsure of the size and scope of their potential exposure and
who may face duplicative litigation.39
Defendants seek finality after litigating a class action and fear the
plaintiff's potential "second bite at the apple" in foreign courts. The
next Subsection discusses the judicial treatment of this issue as part of
the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority inquiry.
2. Superiority and the Risk of Nonrecognition
In determining whether a class action is "superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy,"40 courts consider a set of nonexhaustive factors,
including:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
.41management of a class action.
In transnational class actions, courts tend to focus on "the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
38. See Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1581 & n.103.
39. Walker, supra note 31, at 763 ("[I1t is unfair to purport to bind defendants to
a result that some plaintiff class members might be free to accept or to reject as they
please at some later date. To do so would require a defendant to respond to a claim
by a class of indeterminate size and scope.").
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
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particular forum,"42 and particularly on the question of whether a
foreign court would give res judicata effect to a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out
class action judgment.43
This approach stems from Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. , a
1975 Second Circuit decision written by Judge Henry Friendly. In
Bersch, the plaintiff brought a securities fraud class action on behalf
of "thousands of plaintiffs, preponderantly citizens and residents of
Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and
many other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America." 45
The defendant argued the foreigners should be excluded from the
class because in all of their home countries, the judgment would be
unenforceable. 46 The Second Circuit "direct[ed] that the district court
eliminate from the class action all purchasers other than persons who
were residents or citizens of the United States"47 based in part on:
[U]ncontradicted affidavits that England, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France would not recognize a
United States judgment in favor of the defendant as a bar to an
action by their own citizens, even assuming that the citizens had in
fact received notice that they would be bound unless they
41
affirmatively opted out of the plaintiff class.
The court distinguished between situations where it was merely
possible that the foreign court would not recognize the judgment, and
cases where it was a "near certainty" that the foreign court would not
recognize the judgment.49 Under Bersch, only in the latter situation
should the court exclude the foreign plaintiffs."o
Since Bersch, courts have considered the potential res judicata
effect of their judgments as part of the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement."
This Article does not purport to exhaustively chronicle cases
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
43. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76,
102 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Jasilli, supra note 23, at 117; Bermann, supra note 23, at 95.
44. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 977-78.
46. Id. at 982-83.
47. Id. at 997.
48. Id. at 996-97.
49. Id. at 996.
50. Id.
51. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing cases following Bersch and noting that "res judicata
concerns have been appropriately grafted onto the superiority inquiry.").
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considering this requirement, but it will analyze many representative
cases. One certification decision worth noting is In re Turkcell
Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Securities Litigation.52 Turkcell was not a
foreign-cubed class action because, while there was a foreign class
and Turkcell is a foreign company, the plaintiffs had purchased
Turkcell's American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the New York
Stock Exchange." However, Turkcell argued that certification should
be denied because Turkish courts do not recognize class actions.54
The plaintiffs countered that a Turkish court "would at least look to
the merits of any decision reached by this court, rather than rejecting
it outright."" The court sided with the plaintiff and certified the
class56 despite the fact that defendants argued that the company had
no American assets." The court also discounted the defendant's res
judicata concerns because it seemed unlikely that there would be
future litigation in Turkey and other factors in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D)
counseled in favor of certifying the class.
The same issue was resolved in a similar manner in In re Lloyd's
American Trust Fund Litigation.5 9 In Lloyd's, Citibank provided:
[D]eclarations of foreign counsel, which in sum conclude that
many, if not all, of the foreign Names could sue Citibank a second
time in their home jurisdictions on the very same claims, even if
they are unsuccessful here. The law surveyed includes five
jurisdictions, which are France, England, South Africa, Canada,
and Switzerland, and which represent approximately 58 percent of
the proposed class.
Despite Citibank's showing, the court certified the class, including the
foreign class members, noting "a foreign court may look to the results
achieved here for guidance, thereby contributing to the superiority of
52. In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
53. Id. at 355-56, 359-60.
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 359-61.
57. Id. at 360.
58. Id. at 360-61.
59. In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262 (RWS), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1199, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998).
60. Id. at *43 n.7.
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the class action procedure."6 1  The court also noted that it might
discourage relitigation abroad by adopting a "'proof-of-claim'
mechanism," which only binds class members that "opt-in" to the
lawsuit.62
A more recent case illustrating the modern battle of the experts
is Cromer Finance Limited v. Berger.3 In that case, the court certified
the class including the foreign investors, holding that it was "at most a
'possibility' that a defense verdict will have no res judicata effect
abroad."" In Berger, contrary to the "uncontradicted affidavits" in
Bersch,
[T]he experts on British and Swiss law for both the plaintiffs and
Ernst & Young concede[d] that there is no authoritative law in
either jurisdiction indicating whether a class action judgment
favorable to a defendant would be given preclusive effect in those
.65countries.
Despite this uncertainty, the court certified the class, noting, as in
Turkcell, that it seemed unlikely that there would be future
litigation." The court also reasoned that the possibility of future
nonrecognition did not outweigh other factors in favor of finding the
class action superior.67
In contrast to Berger, Ansari v. New York University" is a case
where the lack of future res judicata effect of a judgment was relevant
to the court's decision not to certify the class. In Ansari, the plaintiff
had not established numerosity, but it was also unlikely that there
would be res judicata effect abroad.69 Similarly, in CL-Alexanders
Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld,o the court also denied class
61. Id. at *44.
62. Id. This solution has also been considered in other cases. See, e.g., In re U.S.
Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 55 (S.D. Cal. 1975). See infra Section II.D. for
discussion of the merits of this solution, which at least one court has held to violate
Rule 23. See Kern ex rel. Estate of Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir.
2004).
63. Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 135 n.32.
67. Id. at 133-35.
68. Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
69. Id.
70. CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruikshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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certification in part because the defendants argued there would be no
res judicata effect in the U.K. unless the parties employed an opt-in
mechanism."
The next two cases to be discussed, In re Vivendi, S.A. Securities
Litigation, and In re Alstom S.A. Securities Litigation, further
highlight the importance of res judicata concerns in cases with foreign
class members. In both of these foreign-cubed cases, the courts
focused much of their superiority inquiry on an identical issue - the
res judicata effect of an opt-out class action under French law - yet
the courts reached opposite results based on the voluminous expert
submissions.
In Vivendi, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York attempted to synthesize previous approaches taken to resolving
the res judicata question, and formulated the following "sliding
scale"" approach, reasoning that the court should "evaluate the risk
of nonrecognition along a continuum."" Specifically,
Where plaintiffs are able to establish a probability that a foreign
court will recognize the res judicata effect of a U.S. class action
judgment, plaintiffs will have established this aspect of the
superiority requirement. Where plaintiffs are unable to show that
foreign court recognition is more likely than not, this factor weighs
against a finding of superiority and, taken in consideration with
other factors, may lead to the exclusion of foreign claimants from
the class. The closer the likelihood of non-recognition is to being a
'near certainty,' the more appropriate it is for the Court to deny
certification of foreign claimants.
Applying the foregoing analysis, the court held that French, British,
and Dutch class members could remain in the action, but that
Germans and Austrians should be excluded because the plaintiffs had
not established that recognition in Germany or Austria was more
likely than not.7 ' Regarding whether the judgment would be
recognized in France, the court held "the class action model is not so
71. Id. at 460.
72. Jasilli, supra note 23, at 121.
73. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 105.
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contrary to French public policy that its use would likely be deemed
an infringement of 'principles of universal justice' or contrary to
'international public policy."'76
The next significant case where a court considered the res
judicata effect of a judgment in a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action
was Alstom.7  Alstom, a French company, along with other
defendants, was sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in the Southern District of New York." The plaintiffs brought
suit on behalf of a class consisting of citizens of the U.S., Canada,
France, England, and the Netherlands.7 9 In considering whether the
foreign courts would give res judicata effect to an opt-out class action
judgment, the court in Alstom reached precisely the opposite
conclusion as Vivendi with regard to French law. The Alstom court
held that a French court would not recognize the opt-out class action
judgment, and excluded all French plaintiffs from the class. While
the court in Alstom distinguished Vivendi on the grounds that there
was a valid forum selection clause in Alstom's Articles of
Association," which foreclosed suits against Alstom in forums other
than France, Alstom was not the only defendant.82 Thus, with respect
to suits against defendants other than Alstom, it is critical that the
court in Alstom disagreed with Vivendi on whether French courts
would find that a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action violated French
public policy. The court held that
A French court would likely conclude that any judgment rendered
by this Court involving absent French class members offends public
policy because absent French investors did not consent to this
Court's jurisdiction over their claims and the United States' class
action procedure would deny them an adequate opportunity to
83participate in the litigation.
Accordingly, the court held that absent French class members should
be excluded from the class even in suits against defendants other than
76. Id. at 101.
77. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
78. Id. at 272.
79. Id. at 281.
80. Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 282.
81. Compare In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi I), 242 F.R.D. 76,
96-97 (S.D.N.Y 2007) with Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 284-87.
82. Alstom, 253 F.R.D at 272; see also Coffee, supra note 1.
83. Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 286.
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Alstom.8 However, the court declined to exclude the Canadian class
members in suits against all defendants," and also allowed the Dutch
and British class members to remain in the class for purposes of suits
against defendants other than Alstom.86
After Alstom, the defendants in Vivendi moved for
reconsideration of the class certification order, citing 'recent'
information"8 and arguing that such information shows that a Rule
23(b)(3) class action is not superior because a French court would not
give res judicata effect to the judgment.' Specifically, the defendants
argued "that the 'legal underpinning' of the Court's opinion - a
comment that while opt-out actions are not presently permitted in
France, 'the ground is shifting quickly' - is no longer correct." 89
Vivendi cited (a) a letter from a member of the French Ministbre de
la Justice saying that an opt-out class action was incompatible with a
Conseil Constitutionnel decision;" (b) two French governmental
reports supporting an opt-in model of consumer group litigation;91 (c)
the opinions, opposing opt-out class actions, of a French business
association and businessperson;" and (d) recent commentary in the
Cahiers du Conseil, an influential publication, discussing how every
''employee [is] free to decide whether or not to take part in [a]
strike." 93
The Vivendi court considered all of these submissions and denied
the motion for reconsideration, holding that its original decision was
correct and that the "'recent' information" cited by the plaintiffs was
merely a reflection of "the ongoing debate in France and the
European Union as to whether class action procedures ought to be
84. Id. at 287.
85. Id. at 291 (holding that Canadian courts would recognize the class action
judgment).
86. Id. at 287-90.
87. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi II), No. 02 Civ. 5571 (RJH)
(HBP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2009).
88. Id. at *16.
89. Id. at *22.
90. Id. at *23.
91. Id. at *27-28.
92. Id. at *29-30.
93. Id. at *31 (citation omitted).
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adopted, with either an opt-in or opt-out feature." 94 The court also
explicitly criticized the Alstom court's reading of two French Conseil
Constitutionnel decisions,95 holding that its own interpretation was
correct and that none of the French cases established that an opt-out
class action would violate the French constitution.
C. The Current Method of Evaluating Superiority in Transnational
Class Actions Inefficiently Exposes Defendants to the Risk of
Duplicative Litigation
The cases discussed above demonstrate some crucial points
regarding judicial consideration of the risk of future nonrecognition
in class certification decisions. This Subsection divides the cases
discussed above into three general categories for ease of discussion.
The following analysis will demonstrate a problem in cases like
Vivendi and Alstom where costly class certification litigation does not
leave either side with a clear picture of the future res judicata effect of
the judgment.
1. Category One: 'Uncontradicted' Cases
First, Bersch shows that it is easy for courts to justify excluding
the foreign class members when there is no evidence contradicting the
conclusion that the foreign courts would not give res judicata effect to
the judgment in the U.S. class action. When defendants persuasively
oppose certification on these grounds and plaintiffs fail to even argue
that the foreign court would recognize the judgment, these foreign
class members should be excluded. An opt-out class action is not a
superior means of adjudication if the parties will be free to relitigate
the merits of the suit because "[p]reclusive effect is the centerpiece of
a viable group litigation mechanism. A class action defendant must
be able to enter into a settlement, or proceed to judgment, with the
assurance that members of the plaintiff class will not later be able to
lodge the same claims again in another forum."" Since the plaintiff
94. Id. at *15-16.
95. Id. at *51-52.
96. Id. at *52-53 ("[N]either Decision finds or implies that individualized consent
through an opt-in mechanism is constitutionally mandated or, stated in the
alternative, that an opt-out procedure based on implicit consent is constitutionally
prohibited, much less offensive to 'fundamental French constitutional values in
accordance with principles of universal justice."').
97. See Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31; see also Walker, supra note 31, at 774
("[T]he operative feature of a class action regime is the preclusive effect that courts
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bears the burden of proving that the class should be certified," the
plaintiff's failure to rebut the defendant's showing that the judgment
will not be recognized abroad should always lead to the class not
being certified.
Accordingly, there is no need for change in these uncontradicted
cases. Where defendants present evidence as they did in Bersch and
it is not rebutted by plaintiffs, courts should follow Bersch in
excluding the putative foreign class members.
2. Category Two: Clear Res Judicata Effect
Second, all of the cases discussed above show that the current
approach works well where it is relatively clear that the foreign court
either will or will not give res judicata effect to the judgment. For
example, the Alstom court excluded French, British and Dutch
shareholders from claims against Alstom (as distinct from claims
against other defendants in the action) on the grounds that Alstom's
Articles of Association contained a valid forum selection clause.
The court was convinced that all three of those countries would give
effect to the forum selection clause, thus refusing to enforce a U.S.
judgment against Alstom.'" Courts and commentators also generally
agree that German"or and Austrian'" courts would not give res
other than the court seized of the class claim must grant to that court's decisions in
claims brought by members of the class. . ..").
98. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Miscellaneous Pension
Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009) ("A district court must conduct a
rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class. . . . The party
seeking certification bears the burden of proof.") (citation omitted); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 n.14 (3d Cir. 2008) ("The burden of proof
rests with the movant."); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186
(9th Cir. 2001) ("As the party seeking class certification, Zinser bears the burden of
demonstrating that she has met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at
least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).") (citation omitted).
99. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 287-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
100. Id. This result in Alstom prompted an argument by Professor Coffee to the
effect that foreign companies should include such forum selection clauses in their
Articles of Association, reasoning that the risks are low and the potential rewards, as
seen in Alstom, may be great. See also Coffee, supra note 1.
101. Rolf Sturner, International Class Actions from a German Point of View, in
MOHR SIEBECK, CURRENT TOPICS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 107, 108-14 (Rolf
Sturner & Masanori Kawano eds., 2009); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig.
(Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
102. Vivendi I, 242 F.R.D. at 105.
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judicata effect to an opt-out class action judgment. Thus, it is a
relatively simple decision for courts to exclude foreign class members
when the foreign class members are from Germany or Austria.
Additionally, Bersch, categorized above as an "uncontradicted case,"
could also easily fit into this "clear" category because the defendant's
affidavits were uncontradicted that foreign courts would not
recognize the judgment.
However, sometimes it is also clear to the court that the foreign
courts would recognize a class action judgment. In those cases,
foreign plaintiffs justifiably remain in the class. In both Vivendi and
Alstom, the courts agreed that British and Dutch courts would more
likely than not give preclusive effect to an opt-out class action
judgment (although in Alstom, the British and Dutch class members
were only allowed to stay in the suit to the extent they were suing
defendants other than Alstom). 103  There also appears to be no
significant controversy as to whether Canadian courts would give res
judicata effect to a U.S. class action judgment: courts and
commentators agree they would."
When the courts of the foreign nation will give preclusive effect,
this cuts in favor of certifying the class, but when they indisputably
will not, as in Germany or Austria, this is a serious factor cutting
against certification."'5 Faced with a serious likelihood that foreign
courts would not recognize the judgment, "if defendants prevail
against a class, they are entitled to a victory no less broad than a
defeat would have been."t' Thus, with respect to countries like
Germany or Austria, the near certainty of nonrecognition abroad
should tip the scales in favor of excluding the foreigners, whereas with
a jurisdiction like Canada, U.S. courts may confidently leave
foreigners in the class knowing they will be bound from relitigating
their claims. The cases discussed above suggest no need for change
where the res judicata effect of a class action judgment is clear and
easily ascertained.
103. Id. at 103, 105; Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 282.
104. See, e.g., Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 290-91; David I. W. Hamer et al., Class
Actions Sans Frontieres, in THE 12TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS
ACrIONS F-1, F-14 to -15 (2008).
105. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31.
106. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975).
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3. Category Three: Unclear Foreign Law and Speculative Decisions
Finally, many of the cases discussed above illustrate the
difficulties courts face when the law is unclear as to whether or not
the foreign country will give res judicata effect to the judgment. For
example, unlike the situation in countries such as Canada, Germany,
and Austria, the Alstom and Vivendi cases show that both courts and
commentators disagree on whether French courts would give res
judicata effect to an opt-out class action judgmentc' The utter
disagreement on whether French courts would enforce class action
judgments led to the dissatisfactory results in Vivendi and Alstom,
where two courts applied the same French precedents and reached
conflicting decisions. This conflict highlights the difficulties faced
by district courts when they are forced to opine on difficult, unsettled
areas of foreign law that foreign courts may have yet to decide. The
Vivendi court described the evidence it reviewed as "a veritable
mountain of expert affidavits on foreign law,""" its decision was then
criticized in Alstom,1 o and it was then faced with a reconsideration
motion, which it denied."' Thus, within a two-year span, two U.S.
District Courts in the same district have considered mountains of
evidence regarding French law, but in three separate decisions have
been unable to agree on the enforceability of an opt-out class action
judgment under French law. This inconsistency is not surprising,
given that the district courts are ultimately offering their best
prediction of what courts in a foreign jurisdiction would decide on a
novel issue. The courts' speculation on French law leads to great
uncertainty for companies potentially exposed to costly litigation on
the merits, not to mention costly litigation over certification.
107. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi II), No. 02 Civ.
5571 (RJH) (HBP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *15-16, *23-34 (S.D.N.Y. May
31, 2009) (describing expert submissions and recent French commentary).
108. Both the Vivendi and Alstom courts applied the requirements set forth in
Munzer v. Munzer, a French Conseil Constitutionnel case, which sets out four
requirements for a French court to recognize a foreign judgment. See In re Vivendi
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Alstom, 253
F.R.D. at 283-87. However, both courts reached different results in applying the
public policy prong of the Munzer test. See Vivendi I, 242 F.R.D. at 101-02; Alstom,
253 F.R.D. at 287.
109. Vivendi , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *20.
110. Compare Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 101-02 with Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 284-87.
111. Vivendi II, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *57.
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Turkcell and Lloyd's demonstrate yet another approach to be
avoided. Despite strong evidence that the Turkish courts would not
recognize a judgment, the court in Turkcell certified the class because
of an ill-defined contention that a Turkish court would "look to the
merits of a decision."11 2 The court in Lloyd's similarly disregarded res
judicata concerns based in part on a notion that the foreign courts
would look to the U.S. judgment for "guidance" because of the case's
connection to New York."' Turkcell and Lloyd's are representative
of cases that adopt a highly speculative, unclear view of how the
foreign court would view the U.S. judgment. Despite this fault,
Lloyd's use of the proof-of-claim (opt-in) mechanism may be enough
to assuage the fears of nonrecognition held by many class action
defendants."4 However, both cases raise the question of whether
courts should keep foreign plaintiffs in the class knowing that
recognition of the judgment abroad seems unlikely because foreign
courts might look to the domestic cases for "guidance." Notably, the
argument that the defendants in Turkcell had no American assets, if
true, would mean that the res judicata issue would be sure to be
litigated in Turkey if the plaintiffs won the suit - without U.S. assets,
plaintiffs would likely go to Turkey to enforce the judgment."' Yet
the Turkcell court found the absence of U.S. assets insignificant, and
in both cases, the courts' decision to side with the plaintiffs' experts
and certify the class leaves great uncertainty for both sides as to the
res judicata effect of their judgments."' Turkcell and Lloyd's also
112. In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
113. In re Lloyd's American, Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262 (RWS), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1199, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,1998).
114. Although, as will be discussed infra Section II.D., this may no longer be
permissible in light of Kern ex rel. Estate of Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 126
(2d Cir. 2004).
115. This is in contrast to the situation described by Professor Buxbaum, where a
multinational defendant has assets in the U.S. sufficient to enforce the judgment in
the U.S. See Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 32.
116. See Turkcell, 209 F.R.D. at 360-61 ("[W]e cannot conclude that a Turkish
court would give no weight to a judgment of this court.... Defendant's assertion that
Turkcell has no American assets does not affect the merits of certification.")
(emphasis added); Lloyd's, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1199, at *44 ("Plaintiffs . . .
contend that a class action is superior to any other method because it will produce a
res judicata effect on any further litigation in the United States, and will have
evidentiary value in any subsequent proceedings in foreign courts. . . . [A] foreign
court may look to the results achieved here for guidance, thereby contributing to the
superiority of the class action procedure.").
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further illustrate how the current approach to considering whether
foreign courts would recognize the judgment is a "battle of experts""
where it is unclear how or why one expert's opinion prevails over
another's."
Regardless of whether Alstom or Vivendi was right on the res
judicata effect of an opt-out class action judgment in France, at least
the courts in those cases carefully defined and considered the issue.
In contrast, the courts in Turkcell and Lloyd's dismissed legitimate
nonrecognition concerns and speculated that even if the foreign court
did not recognize the judgment, it might consider it relevant or
guiding.
Further, when adjudicating the "unclear" cases, some courts
problematically weigh nonrecognition concerns with other factors
supporting certification. For instance, Berger was another case where
there was a battle of the experts. The court declined to exclude the
foreign class members; rather, it sided with the plaintiff's experts with
little analysis, then weighed the risk of nonrecognition against the
other factors cutting in favor of certification."' This approach fails to
give the risk of nonrecognition the importance it deserves. Given the
importance of res judicata concerns to any form of group litigation
regime,120 one might question whether it is proper to resolve this
disputed question in favor of the plaintiffs merely because it seems
unlikely to arise in the futurel2' or because other efficiencies are
122present.
Finally, Ansari and Goldfeld, discussed above, are not the focus
of this Article because the risk of nonrecognition in those cases was
accompanied by other significant problems leading to the denial of
117. See Mulheron, supra note 27 at 445 (citing Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 34);
Jasilli, supra note 23, at 121.
118. See generally Jasilli, supra note 23, at 121. While Jasilli does not analyze
Turkcell or Lloyd's, Jasilli argues that "[a]ll of the approaches fail to identify useful
criteria for evaluating the potential of non-recognition of U.S. class action judgments
by foreign courts and rely too heavily on expert opinions."
119. Id. at 135-36; see In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D.
353, 360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (weighing risk of nonrecognition against other
efficiencies).
120. See Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31.
121. See Cromer Finance Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 135 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
122. Id. at 134-35.
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certification. Both Goldfeld and Ansari denied certification for
reasons including the lack of res judicata effect abroad, but also
including other significant problems. 123  Even the most ardent
supporter of including foreign class members in an opt-out class
action should agree with Ansari's holding that the class should not be
certified if it fails to meet the numerosity requirement1 24 or Goldfeld's
holding that class treatment was inappropriate, not only because of
the res judicata concerns, but also "the small number of class
members, [and] plaintiff's atypical position as underwriter for the
private placement." 125
As shown above, in many of the "Category Three" cases, the
superiority inquiry is leading to costly litigation over the future res
judicata effect and to a risk of inconsistent judgments. Whether the
district court thinks a foreign court might look to the merits (e.g.,
Lloyd'slTurkcell), weigh the risk of nonrecognition against other
factors supporting certification (e.g., Berger), or predict the
recognition abroad using the "more likely than not" standard (e.g.,
VivendiAlstom), the ultimate result is usually an unpredictable battle
of the experts. Thus, a defendant may be forced to defend a class
action without being certain that the whole class will be bound.
D. Considerations in Crafting a Solution and Critique of Other
Proffered Solutions
These cases raise the question of how courts should handle cases
where it is unclear whether the foreign courts would give res judicata
effect to the judgment. As discussed above, the current rule seems to
work well for the uncontradicted cases and the cases in which the
foreign law is clear, but the unclear cases described in Category Three
demonstrate the need for a change. This Subsection will highlight
some of the problems and some important considerations for any
solution, and then briefly discuss and criticize previously proffered
solutions.
123. CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
124. See Ansari, 179 F.R.D. at 116; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (numerosity
requirement).
125. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D at 460; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (numerosity and
typicality requirements).
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1. The Current Method of Evaluating Superiority Is Inefficient and
Uncertain; Any Solution Must Recognize the Fundamental
Importance of Res Judicata and the Purposes of Rule 23
First, any solution must lead to efficiency and finality. Some
courts that have decided to keep foreign plaintiffs in the suit have
emphasized other efficiencies justifying such inclusion,'126 but this
apparent efficiency comes at the expense of the all-important
guarantee of finality with respect to those claims and flies in the face
of the importance of res judicata to any group litigation system, let
alone judicial system. The way the superiority inquiry is currently
being resolved does not serve the purposes of Rule 23, which are
crucial to any superiority inquiry,127 because it entails costly litigation
that does not lead to certainty.128
Any solution must also lead to uniform treatment. Besides its
endorsement of efficiency and judicial economy, an important policy
behind Rule 23 is "promot[ing] ... uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or
bringing about other undesirable results." 129 Vivendi and Alstom flout
this emphasis on consistent results by treating similarly situated
parties differently.
Not only are the results inconsistent and is certainty lacking, but
the question of future res judicata effect is also being fiercely litigated
in district courts. This issue must be resolved more economically.
Vivendi and Alstom generated a motion for reconsideration and a
"veritable mountain" of evidence.o While Rule 23(b)(3) is explicitly
126. See, e.g., Berger, 205 F.R.D. at 135.
127. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76,
91 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 4:28 (4th ed. 2002)).
128. While Rule 23(b)(3) is explicitly concerned with "fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy," see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), it seems nearly impossible
to argue that the Vivendi and Alstom litigation has led to a fair or efficient result
because of the inconsistent holdings and the excessive litigation by which they were
achieved.
129. Mevorah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg.), 571
F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
130. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi II), No. 02 Civ.
5571 (RJH) (HBP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2009).
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concerned with "the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy,"13' "litigating relitigation concerns may violate one of the
fundamental principles of res judicata - judicial economy."132
Finally, the solution should also be predictable and fair. One
would think that similarly situated parties would be treated alike, but
the current approach leads to just the opposite. Consider the
example of a French company after the Alstom and Vivendi decisions.
The company may be unsure as to the extent of its liability around the
world because Alstom directly conflicts with Vivendi. In addition, the
denial of reconsideration in Vivendi further muddies the water by
casting doubt on some of the basis for the Alstom holding. 3 Thus,
French companies now face more doubt as to what their future holds
because of the Vivendi reconsideration order.
The large jury verdict in Vivendi reinforces the importance of all
these goals. The guarantee of preclusive effect is a crucial factor in
any form of group litigation,'34 and efficiency without sacrificing
uniformity of treatment is an important purpose of Rule 23.135 Yet
none of these vital goals can be conclusively guaranteed when foreign
class members remain in the suit and it is unclear whether the foreign
courts would enforce the judgment despite excessive litigation to
predict the res judicata effect abroad. Keeping French plaintiffs in
the Vivendi suit, which later proceeded to a jury verdict under which
the class may receive up to a 9.3 billion dollar judgment,36 is not in
131. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
132. Jasilli, supra note 23, at 132-33; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at §
4403 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (noting that res
judicata "has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating
an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy
by preventing needless litigation.")).
133. See Vivendi II, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 31198, at *52-57.
134. See Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31.
135. See Mevorah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg.),
571 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
136. See Associated Press, Court Finds Vivendi Liable for Misleading Investors,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business
/30vivendi.html. Note that as of the time of publication of this Article, the verdict
was being appealed. Vivendi, Vivendi Will Appeal to Overturn Jury Verdict, Jan. 29,
2010, http://www.vivendi.com/vivendilVivendi-Will-Appeal-to-Overturn. The
Morrison ruling, which will be discussed below, could have a drastic impact on the
actual amount of damages recovered against Vivendi. See Nathan Koppel & Ashby
Jones, Securities Ruling Limits Claims of Fraud, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept.
28, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870369420457551
83013515486 76.html.
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accord with the purposes of Rule 23 when the defendants have no
guarantee that the judgment forecloses all future litigation in France.
This is especially true because, as discussed supra, just a year after the
Vivendi class certification decision the Alstom court excluded French
plaintiffs on the grounds that opt-out class actions violate French
public policy.
2. Dissatisfactory Solutions
Some solutions have been advocated to the problem of
determining whether foreign courts would recognize a class action
judgment, but they are dissatisfactory so long as they lead to foreign
plaintiffs remaining in the class with no guarantee of finality. One
commentator argues that courts should stop considering res judicata
effects at the class certification stage.' This argument posits that
wherever the U.S. has a regulatory interest sufficient to justify
extending subject matter jurisdiction, an exception to res judicata
applies, and thus, the courts need not consider the potential res
judicata effect in other countries. However, the solution to this
problem is certainly not to stop considering res judicata altogether.'39
Up until now, courts have always considered res judicata effects
instead of avoiding the question.'" This is because res judicata is an
extremely important consideration for both plaintiffs and defendants
in class action litigation.14' If the district court simply declines to
consider it, it does not go away.
To illustrate the importance of res judicata, one must only again
consider the recent Vivendi jury verdict. After the court in Vivendi
allowed the French class members to stay in the class,'42 Vivendi lost a
jury trial, in which the jury held that Vivendi was liable for fifty-seven
misstatements.143 If the Vivendi court was wrong in its analysis of the
137. See generally Jasilli, supra note 23 (making this argument).
138. Jasilli, supra note 23, at 135.
139. See Bermann, supra note 23, at 95 (discussing how no courts faced with
foreign classes have failed to consider the recognition of the judgment abroad).
140. Id.
141. Sturner, supra note 101; Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31.
142. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
143. The plaintiffs estimate that the verdict could be up to $9.3 billion dollars. See
Associated Press, supra note 136.
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res judicata effects of its judgment, Vivendi could still be subject to
suits in France, despite the potentially multi-billion dollar verdict it
now faces from the U.S. class suit. Absent class members may bring
suit, arguing they are not bound by the judgment - although it seems
hard to imagine absent foreign class members being dissatisfied with
their share of a potentially multi-billion dollar verdict. Moreover,
French plaintiffs seeking to enforce a judgment against Vivendi, a
French company, may seek to enforce that judgment in France, unless
they can find assets worth up to 9.3 billion dollars in the U.S. If a
French court decides not to enforce the judgment, the Vivendi court is
proven wrong, but the shareholders have to start from scratch in
France. In either event, the litigation does not end, and focusing only
on jurisdiction does not eliminate this problem.
One must also consider another set of hypothetical scenarios:
what if Vivendi had (a) been found not liable, (b) managed to have
the verdict reversed on appeal, or (c) managed to enter into a low
value settlement? In all of these scenarios, plaintiffs are left
dissatisfied and may consider suits elsewhere. Vivendi will have
successfully defended itself in years of litigation, culminating in a jury
verdict, a victory on appeal, or a favorable settlement. However, if
absent members of the class are able to bring new actions in France
or elsewhere, the litigation may continue. Failure to consider the res
judicata effect of the judgment does nothing to counter this concern,
and no courts have taken that route.1
Another proposed solution to this problem, that courts should
adopt a presumption in favor of including foreign class members,
should similarly be avoided.145 This presumption would be a shortcut
that, while efficient in its implementation at the certification stage,
does little to enhance the certainty for either plaintiffs or defendants.
This presumption would deprive both plaintiffs and defendants of any
reasoned decision as to whether the judgment will be entitled to res
judicata effect abroad. Applying this presumption would mean that
plaintiffs seeking to enforce a judgment abroad will not even have a
reasoned decision on whether the judgment will be entitled to res
judicata effect. Defendants resisting the suit may similarly face the
144. See Bermann, supra note 23.
145. Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1598-99 (arguing for a "presumption in favor of
including foreign claimants in small-claim class action lawsuits" which could be
rebutted by "presenting concrete evidence that the foreign claimants do, in fact, have
adequate alternative remedies or could, from a practical standpoint, sue again in the
courts of their home countries.").
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prospect of duplicative litigation with little chance to contest the
inclusion of foreign class members. This approach is also insufficient
because while the presumption is rebuttable, it impermissibly shifts
the burden of proof from the plaintiffs 46 to the defendants at the class
certification stage, requiring the defendant seeking to rebut the
presumption to offer "concrete evidence that the foreign claimants
do, in fact, have adequate alternative remedies or could, from a
practical standpoint, sue again in the courts of their home
countries."147 The defendants in these cases should not be forced to
rebut such a presumption and prove the content of foreign law
because the burden of proof on a motion for class certification is not
theirs.148
Finally, courts and commentators have discussed the use of an
opt-in mechanism instead of an opt-out mechanism.149 Using an opt-
in class action would arguably enhance the likelihood of foreign
courts recognizing class action judgments because the class action
would only purport to bind plaintiffs who had affirmatively opted into
the class, as opposed to absent parties who did not participate in the
case in any way. This solution would make for less of a conflict with
foreign law, and it is likely an opt-in class action judgment would be
less contrary to public policy in many countries. Parties seeking to
avoid completely excluding foreign class members or a denial of
146. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Miscellaneous Pension
Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009) ("A district court must conduct a
rigorous analysis of the rule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class. . . . The party
seeking certification bears the burden of proof.") (citation omitted); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 n.14 (3d Cir. 2008) ("The burden of proof
rests with the movant."); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186
(9th Cir. 2001) ("As the party seeking class certification, Zinser bears the burden of
demonstrating that she has met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at
least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).") (citation omitted).
147. See Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1598-99.
148. See, e.g., Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. Moreover, the burden of proof is high. See
Stadtler, supra note 26, at 1595-96 (discussing the "rigorous analysis" required by
Supreme Court precedent such as General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)).
149. See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 55 (S.D. Cal. 1975); In re
Lloyd's American, Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262 (RWS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1199, at *44-45 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998) (discussing proof-of-claim mechanism); see
also Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions
and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 41, 85-89 (2003) (arguing for opt-in
class actions when class members are foreign).
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certification may argue for an opt-in class.
One potential problem with this solution is that it may be
impermissible under Rule 23 to have an opt-in class, as Rule 23
expressly provides for opt-out rights but does not provide for opt-in
class actions."'o Indeed, the Second Circuit reversed a class
certification decision where the district court had certified an opt-in
class."' That case concerned a fatal ski train crash in Austria, with
victims from countries including the U.S., Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, and Japan.5 2 The defendants argued that a class action
judgment would not be enforced abroad, but the plaintiffs countered
by seeking certification of an opt-in class whereby all who opted into
the class agreed not to litigate their claims in foreign fora.5 3 The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that Rule 23 does not permit an opt-
in class.5 4
Although some cases previously resolved res judicata concerns
by using an opt-in class instead of an opt-out class,"' the Second
Circuit's recent rejection of an opt-in class'56 casts significant doubt on
the validity of this solution. In any event, this solution is not the focus
of this Article, which advocates below for the wholesale exclusion of
foreign plaintiffs. However, to the extent it would reduce res judicata
concerns, an opt-in class action would be a better solution than either
presumptively including all foreign class members or ignoring res
judicata entirely.
3. A Temporary Problem That Will Eventually Be Solved by Foreign
Countries
In fashioning a solution to the problem of determining the res
judicata effect of a class action judgment under foreign law, one must
also remember that foreign governments and courts will eventually
decide for themselves whether a class action judgment is enforceable.
150. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. at 54. The court reserved the right to
establish an opt-in mechanism if necessary.
151. Kern ex rel. Estate of Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
152. Id. at 122.
153. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, 220 F.R.D. 195, 209-11 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 2003), overruled by Kern, 393 F.3d at 126-29.
154. Kern, 393 F.3d at 126-29.
155. See In re Lloyd's American, Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262 (RWS), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1199, at *44-45 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.,
69 F.R.D. 24, 54 (S.D. Cal. 1975)
156. Kern, 393 F.3d at 126.
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The current uncertainty over whether many foreign countries would
recognize an opt-out class action judgment reflects an ongoing debate
in many countries as to the proper means of aggregating litigation.'
Professor George Bermann notes that "[a]round the globe, law
reformers are trying to figure out a way to reap the advantages of
collective or aggregate litigation without turning their backs on
longstanding and fundamental tenets of their legal order.""' As
discussed supra, the res judicata effect of a class action judgment has
already been well-established with respect to many different
countries, and that list will surely continue to grow as time goes on.
There are three simple ways that foreign countries could resolve
these issues. The first, clearest way to resolve the controversy over
future res judicata effect would be for foreign courts to directly
consider the res judicata effect of an opt-out class action. For
example, if plaintiffs tried to enforce a judgment from a U.S. class
action in a foreign country, or defendants win or settle and then raise
res judicata as a shield to prevent relitigation of claims abroad, the
result would be a decision that clarifies the uncertainty. Once there
are guiding decisions in many jurisdictions, U.S. district courts will no
longer have to speculate. 5 9
The next two ways to resolve this issue are less certain, but
provide valuable evidence of whether a foreign court would give res
judicata effect to a class action judgment. Legal developments in
other countries can give U.S. district courts the requisite certainty to
include or exclude foreign class members when dealing with class
certification motions." A foreign country might establish an
157. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi 1), 242 F.R.D. 76, 101-02
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Bermann, supra note 24, at 99.
158. Bermann, supra note 23, at 99.
159. See id. ("Have these enactments subsequently been the subject of judicial
pronouncements as to their constitutionality - or as to how they would have to be
construed in order to be considered constitutional?"); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A.
Sec. Litig. (Vivendi II), No. 02 Civ. 5571 (RJH) (HBP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198,
at *29 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2009).
160. See, e.g., Vivendi II, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *15-16 (considering legal
developments); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(considering recent legal developments in France); Vivendi I, 242 F.R.D. at 104-05;
see Bermann, supra note 23, at 98-99 (discussing relevant considerations including the
group litigation models of other countries). The legislative history of the group
litigation scheme may also be relevant. See id. at 99.
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aggregate litigation regime (a) similar to the U.S. opt-out regime,
which would militate in favor of that country recognizing U.S. class
action judgments, or (b) different from the U.S. regime (for instance,
an opt-in regime), which would cut against that country recognizing
U.S. class action judgments. However, this type of legal development
is not dispositive. First, a foreign court must test the constitutionality
of its class action regime,"' which is why judicial decisions either
recognizing or declining to recognize class action judgments are
crucial. Additionally, a country with an opt-in class action regime
could still recognize U.S. opt-out class action judgments: for example,
the U.K. has an opt-in class action regime,162 but both the Alstom and
Vivendi courts agreed that British courts would recognize an opt-out
class action judgment."' Therefore, while legal developments abroad
will help, the clearest way to establish the res judicata effect of an opt-
out class action judgment is for the foreign courts to decide the issue.
III. Courts Should Exclude Foreign Class Members When
the Res Judicata Effect in the Foreign Country Is Unclear
This Section attempts to answer the question of what district
courts should do until foreign countries conclusively figure out these
questions for themselves. Despite the demonstrated difficulties
associated with such an inquiry, courts should continue to consider
the res judicata effect of class action judgments in foreign countries as
part of the superiority inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). A significant risk
of the judgment not being recognized abroad should be, as it has been
for over thirty years, enough to exclude foreign plaintiffs from a class.
Companies should not be subjected to costly litigation in the U.S.
without certainty that class members are barred from relitigation,m
and despite the fact that defendants raise the res judicata concern, it
161. Vivendi II, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *29 n.7.
162. See Mulheron, supra note 27, at 427.
163. Vivendi I, 242 F.R.D. at 103; Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 287-90. Note, however,
that this result conflicts with at least one earlier case involving a British defendant.
See, e.g., CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying certification because, inter alia, certifying class would
require an opt-in mechanism to be enforceable in the U.K.). The conflicting
treatment of British class members from Goldfeld to Vivendi/Alstom further
illustrates that the res judicata effect of a judgment abroad evolves over time.
164. See Jasilli, supra note 23, at 133 (citing KEVIN CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 302 (2d ed. 2009) ("[J]ustice demands that there be an end to
litigation ... every legal system, from its beginnings, generates a common core of res
judicata law to make decisions final.")).
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is also of value to plaintiffs seeking to execute a judgment against a
foreign company, especially one without assets in the U.S.'
However, as the cases discussed above show, it is nearly impossible to
determine in advance whether a foreign court will recognize a class
action judgment, and judicial efforts to balance the risk of
nonrecognition with other factors supporting certification have done
nothing to diminish the risk of nonrecognition.
As I argue below, courts should exclude foreign class members in
cases where the res judicata effect of a class action judgment in the
foreign country is unclear. Moreover, even where it appears, after a
"rigorous analysis,"'" that a class action judgment would be given res
judicata effect in a foreign country, courts may exclude foreign class
members because of the emerging availability of methods of mass
claim settling in Europe. The risk of nonrecognition abroad, coupled
with the growing mechanisms for mass claim settlement in Europe,
both support a finding that an opt-out class action is not "superior to
other available methods of fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.",67
A. Excluding Foreign Class Members: Application to Three
Categories of Cases
Potential foreign class members should be excluded whenever
the situation in Vivendi repeats itself: dueling, voluminous expert
declarations on the effect of a class action judgment in another legal
system, with no clear or uncontradicted answer. If the court
determines that there is uncertainty as to whether the class action
judgment would be recognized in the countries where foreign
putative class members reside, the court should exclude them from
the class.
Importantly, plaintiffs will have the opportunity to contest the
defendant's evidence as to uncertainty. The court may also choose to
allow the foreign claimants to remain in the class if, after the required
165. In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler, A.S. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting how defendants argued there were no assets in the U.S.);
Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31 ("[T]he defendants in multinational actions generally
have assets in the United States sufficient to satisfy any judgment there.").
166. See, e.g., Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 83; Stadtler, supra note 26, at 1595-96
(discussing this requirement).
167. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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rigorous analysis, it determines that a foreign court actually would
enforce the judgment, i.e., that there is no dispute as to the res
judicata effect. Defendants seeking to certify the class for settlement
purposes may also fail to raise the res judicata concerns in the interest
of settling the case. They might consider potential relitigation abroad
as yet another factor that would go into the settlement value of the
case.
Applying this rule to the three categories of cases described
supra, the following would occur. In the Category One,
Uncontradicted Cases, the foreign class members would be excluded
if the defendants presented uncontradicted evidence that the foreign
judgment would not be enforced in those countries. Thus, the result
would be the same as it currently is under Bersch.
In the "clear" cases in Category Two, the results should also stay
the same as under the current Vivendi approach. Consider England
as an example. Defendants seeking to exclude foreign class members
might argue that British courts would not recognize a class action
judgment, but at least recently, U.S. courts have agreed that British
courts would recognize an opt-out class action judgment.'" In these
circumstances, defendants will likely be unable to convince the court
that it is unclear whether a British court would recognize a class
action judgment. Another example of when courts should allow the
foreign class members to stay in the class, despite the rule for which I
advocate, is if the foreign class members are from Canada. As
discussed supra, there is no dispute as to whether Canadian courts
would recognize class action judgments. In contrast, with respect to
countries like Germany and Austria, it is relatively clear that courts in
those countries would not enforce an opt-out class action judgment."
Plaintiffs from those countries should still be excluded from the class.
This rule would bring the most significant change to the
"unclear" cases in Category Three, such as Turkcell, Lloyd's, Vivendi,
and Alstom. Rather than examining a "veritable mountain" of expert
evidence and casting its own prediction, the court would note that it is
unclear whether the judgment would be enforced in the class
member's home countries. Courts would then exclude foreign class
members on that basis instead of attempting to predict the likelihood
of recognition abroad. Additionally, plaintiffs would no longer be
168. See, e.g., Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 103; Alstom, 253 F.R.D. at 287-90.
169. Sturner, supra note 101 (discussing Germany); Vivendi 1, 242 F.R.D. at 104-05
(discussing Germany and Austria).
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able to rely on a Turkcell or Lloyd's type argument, that perhaps the
courts would "look to the merits" of the judgment when there is a
serious dispute as to res judicata effect. Nor could courts note the
uncertainty, but resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiffs if
certification is otherwise efficient, as in Berger. Rather, the foreign
class members would be out of the class and the uncertainty would be
eliminated.
B. This Solution Is Within the District Court's Discretion and
Efficiently Ensures That Relitigation Concerns Disappear
Excluding foreign class members would be the district court's
way of erring on the side of caution where it is unclear whether its
judgment would have any res judicata effect in a foreign country. The
district court is justified in excluding the foreign class members when
there is a real risk of nonrecognition for many reasons.
First, excluding foreign class members is well within the
discretion of district judges. "A district court has broad discretion in
defining the class' and 'is not bound by the class definition proposed
in the complaint."'" Over the years, courts have excluded foreign
class members many times, for various reasons. As discussed supra,
the risk of nonrecognition abroad has justified the exclusion of
plaintiffs for the last thirty-five years. Both the Second Circuit in
Bersch and district courts have excluded foreign class members or
denied certification based on the risk of nonrecognition abroad. As
discussed supra, representative district court cases considering this
factor include Vivendi, Alstom, Ansari, and Goldfeld.72
170. See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., No. 04 Civ. 0030, Master Docket 04 MD
1653 (LAK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64296, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008) (citing
Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1999); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)
(discretion to certify particular issues); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5) (discretion to certify
subclasses).
171. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64296, at *11-12 (quoting
Robidoux ex rel. Rock v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 937 (2d Cir. 1993); Lundquist v. Sec.
Pac. Auto. Fin. Servs. Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Robidoux)).
172. To the contrary, sometimes courts keep foreigners in the class because the
defendants fail to bring forth sufficient evidence on foreign law. See, e.g., Marsden ex
rel. v. Select Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480, 486, 490 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Jordan v.
Global Natural Res., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 45, 52 (S.D. Oh. 1984) (citation omitted).
Based on cases like Vivendi and Alstom, one could argue these cases would have
turned out differently had the defendants presented stronger evidence.
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Courts have also exercised broad power to define the class, even
excluding foreign class members for manageability reasons. For
example, in In re Daimler Chrysler AG Securities Litigation,"' the
court excluded all foreign class members based on practical
difficulties associated with having a class of foreign investors and
difficulties in calculating damages to foreign plaintiffs. In In re
Parmalat Securities Litigation, the court excluded foreign plaintiffs
from the class in part because the court had already determined that
there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign plaintiffs'
claims and because of the possibility that the foreign courts would not
give res judicata effect to the judgment.'74 Once the class was defined
not to include foreign plaintiffs, the court had no trouble finding that
the superiority requirement was met."'
Once district courts decide to exclude foreign class members,
their decisions to do so should be upheld on appeal under the abuse
of discretion standard of review. 6 The abuse of discretion standard is
a deferential standard," under which
An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court, in making a
discretionary ruling, relies upon an improper factor, omits
consideration of a factor entitled to substantial weight, or mulls the
correct mix of factors but makes a clear error of judgment in
assaying them.
Considering the problems associated with keeping foreign
plaintiffs in a class, discussed above, the decision to exclude foreign
class members should easily survive appeal. Excluding foreign
plaintiffs is crucially tied to the superiority inquiry and helps ensure
the efficient adjudication of the dispute by preventing potential
plaintiffs from having an opportunity to relitigate their claims abroad.
As has been shown above, this has long been considered an important
factor in class certification decisions, and courts have attached
dispositive weight to it. Excluding foreign plaintiffs from the class
173. Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG (In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec.
Litig.), 216 F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003).
174. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64296, at *9-12.
175. Id. at *40. Another case along those lines is In re Scor Holding (Switz.) AG
Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), in which the court easily found the
superiority requirement met once the foreign plaintiffs were excluded from the class
on the grounds that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.
176. See Parra v. Basha's, Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008).
177. Yokoyama v. Midland Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010).
178. Parra, 536 F.3d at 977-78.
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also helps the court avoid other problems associated with their
inclusion in the class. While this Article focuses on the risk of the
judgment not being recognized, courts dealing with foreign classes
often grapple with difficult questions of subject matter jurisdiction,
forum non conveniens, lead plaintiff status, notice, and other
manageability concerns."
The foregoing paragraphs have shown that district courts can
exclude foreign class members when the res judicata effect of the
judgment is unclear. Not only can district courts exclude foreign class
members, but they should exclude them. In these circumstances,
excluding foreign class members furthers the purpose of Rule 23.
District judges should be guided by the underlying purposes of Rule
23 in considering whether a class action is superior to other methods
of adjudicating the lawsuit. That is, they should "focus on the
efficiency and economy elements of the class action so that cases
allowed under subdivision (b)(3) are those that can be adjudicated
most profitably on a representative basis."'8o Moreover,
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority requirements were
added to cover cases in which a class action would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.18 1
Against this backdrop, whatever method courts use to determine
superiority should not be capable of leading to the results in Vivendi
and Alstom. In those cases, the parties spent considerable resources
arguing whether the legal systems of many different countries would
recognize a judgment in a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, but with
respect to France, they were left with little more than inconsistent
guesses. Both efficiency and fairness - in the sense of treating like
situations alike - counsel in favor of excluding foreign class members
179. See, e.g., Buettgen v. Harless, 263 F.R.D. 378, 382-83 (N.D. Tex. 2009);
Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG (In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig.), 216
F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003); Harbour & Northrip, supra note 27, at F-23 to -24;
Bermann, supra note 23, at 100.
180. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1780; see also Mevorah v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg. (In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg.), 571 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009)
("A principal purpose behind Rule 23 class actions is to promote efficiency and
economy of litigation.") (citation and quotation omitted).
181. Mevorah, 571 F.3d at 958 (citations and quotations omitted).
352011]1
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
when there is doubt as to the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment.
Why should Alstom be treated differently than Vivendi, and why
should other French companies not know what to expect?
My solution, unlike the current approach, offers the advantage of
eliminating the costly litigation that the superiority inquiry currently
generates and ensuring that like companies - and like absent foreign
class members - are treated alike by stopping district courts from
having to speculate on the content and import of unclear foreign law.
Eliminating the uncertainty and speculation will ensure a more
efficient resolution of the case, while consistently erring on the side of
caution will ensure that relitigation does not occur. Accordingly,
district courts should exclude foreign class members where it is
unclear whether their home countries would enforce the judgment.
C. Excluding European Class Members Is Further Justified Because
of the Developing Aggregate Litigation and Mass Claim
Settlement Procedures in Europe
This Section has already established both that district courts have
discretion to exclude foreign class members and that doing so would
further the purposes of Rule 23 because it would efficiently lessen the
risk of inconsistent treatment. This Subsection argues that
particularly when district courts are faced with European class
members, exclusion of foreign class members is further justified
because there are now effective means of settling mass claims in
Europe. This Article will not exhaustively discuss these methods, but
will highlight a recent mass settlement under the Dutch Collective
Settlement of Mass Damages Act of 2005 (Dutch Collective
Settlement Act) as an example of how this could work in practice.
1. Overview of the Dutch Collective Settlement Act
The Dutch Collective Settlement Act uses a "design for
collective settlement that can best be described as a composite of a
voluntary settlement contract sealed with a 'judicial trust mark'
attached to the contract."'" The Act "permits mass settlement of
claims but does not permit class-action litigation.""'3 Unlike U.S. class
182. Willem H. Van Boom, Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the
Netherlands, in AUF DEM WEG ZU EINER EUROPAISCHEN SAMMELKLAGE? 171, 178
(Matthias Casper et al., eds., 2009), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=1456819.
183. Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, The Continuing Evolution of Securities
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actions, the Dutch Collective Settlement Act exists only to help
promote settlement, not litigation of claims.'8
Settling claims under the Collective Settlement Act works as
follows. The first step in settling mass claims under the Act occurs
when the allegedly liable parties reach an agreement on settlement
terms with a "foundation/association acting in the aligned common
interest of individuals involved (and injured)."' Next, the parties
"jointly petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to make the
settlement binding on all persons to whom damage was caused."
While these persons (like absent class members in Rule 23(b)(3)
classes) are not summoned, they are given notice of the proceeding.
The Court of Appeals then hears arguments on the merits of the
settlement and can amend the settlement if necessary." In reviewing
the settlement, the court considers "several points concerning the
substantive and procedural fairness and efficiency of the settlement
(e.g., amount of compensation, adequate representation of interested
parties)."" Once approved, the settlement is binding "upon all
persons to whom damage was caused and that are accommodated by
the settlement."'9 Injured persons who do not agree with the
settlement may opt-out, and are not bound by the settlement. 9'
This significant development in Europe should have a major
effect on U.S. class action litigation when the cases include European
plaintiffs. When considering whether a class action is superior to
other forms of adjudicating the dispute, courts may decide against
certification or exclude foreign plaintiffs if there are other methods of
adjudicating suits abroad that help to avoid the problems associated
with keeping such suits in the U.S. It would not be difficult to justify
declining to certify the class or excluding foreign class members when
Class Actions Symposium: Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-
Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIs. L. REV. 465,485 (2009).
184. See id.






191. Id. at 184 ("[T]he only remedy available to injured individuals is to opt out of
the settlement if they feel it is unfair.").
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the foreign class members have a sufficient remedy in Europe. The
Dutch Collective Settlement Act may also be a harbinger of things to
come in Europe - it shows that European countries, traditionally
reluctant to adopt opt-out group litigation systems, may be moving in
that direction.
Adjudicating claims via the Dutch Collective Settlement Act is
superior to a class action lawsuit because the Dutch Collective
Settlement Act should produce binding settlements of claims without
the attendant res judicata concerns that result from settlements or
judgments in the U.S. For example, while Vivendi and Alstom show
that there are significant doubts about whether a French court would
recognize an opt-out class action judgment, countries within the
European Union are required to recognize the judgments of other
European Union countries as long as the party seeking enforcement
of the judgment complies with basic requirements of the European
Union's Brussels I Regulation.'2 Thus, a settlement under the Dutch
Collective Settlement Act should be binding in France and elsewhere
in Europe."' Had Vivendi or Alstom settled with plaintiffs under the
Dutch Collective Settlement Act, the settlement could have been
binding on all European class members. 94
The Dutch Collective Settlement Act has already begun to have
an effect on U.S. class action litigation. For instance, in In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transport Securities Litigation, the district court initially
held that there was subject matter jurisdiction over securities fraud
claims against a Dutch company based on shares purchased on both
overseas and domestic markets.'95 After the court held that there was
192. See Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 33-34, 38, 41, 2000
O.J. (L12) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:EN:PDF [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]; see also
Jeunger, supra note 36, at 116 (referring to the ease of enforcement under Brussels
and Lugano Conventions, the precursors to the Brussels Regulation); Michael
Goldhaber, 'Shell Model' Opens Door to European Class Actions, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER, Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2008/01/08/lawcom-
shell-model-opens-door-to-european-class-actions/ ("And once the deal is approved
by a Dutch court, it is highly likely to be enforceable throughout Europe through the
European Commission regulation on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments.").
193. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 192, at art. 33.
194. See Goldhaber, supra note 192 (discussing the possibility of non-Dutch
defendants taking advantage of the Collective Settlement Act).
195. In re Royal DutchlShell Transp. Sec. Litig. (Dutch Shell 1), 380 F. Supp. 2d
509, 548 (D.N.J. 2005); see Choi & Silberman, supra note 183, at 484 (discussing this
case).
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subject matter jurisdiction, Shell settled all of its foreign claims under
the Dutch Collective Settlement Act, but made the settlement
conditional upon the district court dismissing the claims of the non-
U.S. purchasers.'96 The defendant moved again to dismiss the claims
of the foreign purchasers for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and
was successful because of the case's lack of connection to the U.S."*
Significantly, "[t]he court buttressed its decision by noting that the
non-U.S. purchasers can seek recovery through the settlement
agreement entered into before the Amsterdam Court of Appeals or
through procedures available within their respective jurisdictions." 98
Future courts assessing the superiority of a U.S. class action with a
global class should take careful note of the availability of the Dutch
Settlement Act to potentially resolve the dispute with no risk of
nonrecognition.
2. Resolving European Claims Through European Remedies Is More
Efficient for U.S. Courts, Satisfies Both Plaintiffs and
Defendants, and Alleviates the Res Judicata and 'Judicial
Imperialism' Concerns Raised by Cases Like Vivendi
The Royal Dutch/Shell case described supra, although it involved
a denial of subject matter jurisdiction, offers courts another way of
avoiding the problems plaguing district courts in transnational class
actions. As Europe's group litigation procedures develop, it becomes
less necessary to use scarce American judicial resources on costly
class action litigation in the U.S. involving foreign classes.
U.S. district courts should help conserve the "precious resources
of U.S. courts"19' by recognizing that there are alternative ways to
resolve these lawsuits, in Europe, that do not have the attendant risk
of nonrecognition associated with U.S. class actions. As discussed
above, other European courts would recognize a binding settlement
achieved under the Dutch Collective Settlement Act. Thus, the
company that chooses to settle a dispute under the Dutch Collective
Settlement Act at least has assurance that the settlement will be
196. Choi & Silberman, supra note 183, at 485; In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp.
Sec. Litig.(Dutch Shell l), 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 715-16 (D.N.J. 2007).
197. Dutch Shell H, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 723-24.
198. Choi & Silberman, supra note 183, at 485; Dutch Shell II, 522 F. Supp. 2d at
723-24.
199. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
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binding on all the injured parties whose claims it settles.2 00 In
contrast, as discussed supra Section II, the company settling a case or
litigating it to judgment as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action often has little
assurance that foreign courts will recognize the judgment.
Parties seeking to resolve disputes may also settle their claims
under the Dutch Collective Settlement Act more efficiently than if
these claims were resolved in class action litigation because a
settlement under the Dutch Collective Settlement Act is like a
contract with an opt-out right and court approval. Under the
Collective Settlement Act, the parties need not even have a pending
lawsuit in order to secure a binding settlement.201  In contrast,
consider the Vivendi litigation, where between the Vivendi
certification decision and the Vivendi denial of reconsideration, and
the intervening Alstom decision, the parties fiercely litigated the
question of future res judicata effect of the eventual Vivendi
judgment.2 0 If courts exclude foreign class members because of the
possibility of these foreign class members settling their claims under
the Dutch Collective Settlement Act, the inefficient situation
described above is avoided. Not only would U.S. judicial resources be
preserved, but the resources of the parties would also be saved and
the parties might actually be satisfied with the result of the litigation.
For example, in the Dutch Shell settlement, foreign class members
received nearly a half a billion dollars, including nearly fifty million
dollars in attorney's fees.203
The Dutch Collective Settlement Act may not be a panacea for
the perceived ills of transnational class action litigationo2 nor will it
200. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 192, at art. 41 ("The judgment shall be
declared enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53
without any review under Articles 34 and 35. The party against whom enforcement is
sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any submissions
on the application."); see also id. at arts. 34-35, 53-54.
201. Van Boom, supra note 182, at 179.
202. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig. (Vivendi II), No. 02 Civ. 5571 (RJH)
(HBP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31198, at *54 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2009) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note).
203. Goldhaber, supra note 192.
204. See Koppel & Jones, supra note 136 ("Foreign shareholders often prefer U.S.
courts 'because they have a reputation, deservedly so, of being very plaintiff-
friendly"'); Tony Mauro, Justices Hostile to Foreign-Cubed Cases, THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 29, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.
jsp?id=1202447036487&Justices-hostile-to-foreigncubedcases (discussing foreign
countries' dissatisfaction with U.S. courts' interference in their regulatory schemes);
Coffee, supra note 1.
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apply in all cases. It is important to note that it is the parties' burden
to raise foreign law issues.205 Thus, if defendants choose to settle or
litigate the class action in the U.S., they are free to do so without
objecting that there are other available remedies abroad. Nor are
defendants obligated to do as the defendants in the Royal/Dutch Shell
case did and limit the scope of the litigation in the U.S. by settling
their claims abroad. However, based on the results of the Dutch Shell
settlement, defense counsel would be well advised to argue that the
growing number of effective procedures in the law of European
countries should preclude certification.206 Even if the court certifies
the class, defendants may still seek to settle with non-U.S. plaintiffs in
Europe.
At the same time, merely recognizing that foreign methods of
adjudication may be superior does not leave foreign plaintiffs without
remedies in the U.S. in all cases. In accordance with the rule for
which I argued above, if plaintiffs can show that a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action judgment would be recognized in the foreign country, the
district court may certify the class and allow foreigners to remain in
the class. However, in light of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals'
recent approval of the Dutch Shell settlement, it is hard to justify
keeping Dutch claimants in both the Vivendi and Alstom lawsuits
when there was an alternative remedy for their claims and possibly
other European claims - a settlement under the Dutch Collective
Settlement Act that would be binding throughout Europe.
Additionally, since the Dutch court in the Dutch Shell litigation
asserted jurisdiction over all foreign claims, not just the Dutch claims,
this expansive jurisdiction may offer settlement possibilities for
litigants from many countries.2
If courts deny certification because of the procedures available
abroad, they should consider that the Dutch are not the only ones
with expanding group litigation possibilities. For example, the
exclusion of German and Austrian plaintiffs in Vivendi and Alstom
seems all the more justified in light of the emerging procedures for
205. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (requiring notice of intent to raise foreign law issues);
SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION 229 (2004) (discussing how it is
the parties' burden to raise issues of foreign law).
206. See generally Choi & Silberman, supra note 183 (discussing group litigation
mechanisms in Europe).
207. See Goldhaber, supra note 192.
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resolving mass claims in those countries. Notably, Germany and
Austria have model case, or test case, procedures whereby one
plaintiff may sue for "false, misleading, or omitted public capital-
markets information."2  In Germany, "the model case proceeds and
then all individual cases are decided on the basis of the model-case
decision." 2" This line of reasoning may even induce courts to exclude
British plaintiffs because of group litigation orders, which are similar
to model case procedures, if the court finds such an action superior to
a class action in the U.S. 210
Finally, courts should exclude European plaintiffs from the class
when European remedies are available because doing so would
reduce some of the conflict between jurisdictions resulting from the
export of U.S. substantive and procedural law.211 Indeed the U.K.,
France, and Australia recently submitted amicus briefs in the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing against jurisdiction over foreign-cubed
claims, arguing that "if the [defendant] loses, U.S. courts will interfere
with the policy choices they have made in regulating securities." 212
The U.K. specifically argued that "claims against companies whose
shares were bought in the U.K. should be heard in the U.K."213 In
contrast, European academics have looked favorably on the outcome
of the Dutch Shell litigation, noting, "It's appropriate if European
courts solve European problems" and "European class actions in U.S.
courts might be a nice source of business for American law firms. . .
but there is something ugly about judicial imperialism." 214
Accordingly, excluding foreign class members stops plaintiffs from
208. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 183, at 486-88 (discussing Germany and
other countries); Harbour & Northrip, supra note 27, at F-31.
209. Choi & Silberman, supra note 183, at 487; see generally Mulheron, supra note
27, at 418-19.
210. Choi & Silberman, supra note 183, at 487.
211. See Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 62-63 (discussing this problem in the subject
matter jurisdiction context).
212. Mauro, supra note 204; see also Securities Law Practice Center, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank: A Discussion with Counsel for Each Side, http://
seclawcenter.pli.edu/2010/07/09/morrison-v-national-australia-bank-a-discussion-with
-counsel-for-each-side (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) ("Conway also thought the amicus
briefs played a big part, saying that briefs from the U.K., France and Australia were
very persuasive. Each of the three filed strong briefs pointing out their system of
securities regulation and remedies and saying that they didn't want the U.S.
imposing our law on them."); Morrison v. Nat'1 Australian Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2885-86 (2010) (citing amici briefs filed by foreign countries).
213. Seib & Spence, supra note 1.
214. Goldhaber, supra note 192.
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avoiding their country's distinctive regulatory and procedural
schemes in order to sue under what plaintiffs consider to be more
favorable law in the U.S. courts. The remedies for settling or
litigating mass claims in other countries should be highly relevant to
the superiority inquiry. Where these foreign remedies are present,
they are the superior means by which shareholders should vindicate
their rights.
D. Responses to Morrison and Possible Counterarguments
This Subsection first briefly discusses the implications of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australian Bank
Ltd.215 It next briefly addresses and dispels some possible counter-
arguments to my proposed solution, including the argument that
remedies abroad are inadequate and the argument that excluding
foreign class members might lead to an under-inclusive plaintiff class.
Ultimately, none of these arguments offer a persuasive justification to
leave foreigners in the class when it is unclear that the judgment will
have res judicata effect in their home countries.
1. Morrison's Impact
The recent decision in Morrison v. National Australian Bank
Ltd.21 necessitates some brief discussion because it drastically
changed the subject matter jurisdiction analysis which had allowed
some foreign-cubed securities fraud cases (such as Vivendi and
Alstom, discussed supra) to survive jurisdictional challenges.
Morrison considered the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities
laws.217 In Morrison, the Court held that "Section 10(b) reaches the
use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an
American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other
security in the U.S." 218  The Court criticized and repudiated the
Second Circuit's long-standing approach of looking at the conduct
and/or effects that occurred within the U.S. in order to determine
215. Morrison v. Nat'l Australian Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2883.
218. Id. at 2888.
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whether there was subject matter jurisdiction.21 9 Justice Scalia's
opinion prescribes a bright-line approach that will keep many
transnational class actions out of the U.S. courts. The Court's holding
eliminates the so-called foreign-cubed class actions because by
definition, a foreign-cubed claim involves securities listed on a foreign
exchange, while the Supreme Court's new test requires the security
be listed in the U.S. and the subject of a transaction in the U.S.2 20
Under this rule, there would no longer be a cause of action for claims
like many of those in Vivendi and Alstom. Nor would U.S. securities
laws apply to foreign-squared cases (cases with a domestic plaintiff
who purchased stock from a foreign issuer on a foreign-exchange).22'
Morrison will stop the flow of foreign-cubed and foreign-squared
securities fraud cases, but it will by no means put a halt to
transnational litigation and the accompanying risk of nonrecognition
abroad. As Professor Wasserman notes, "even after Morrison, class
counsel are likely to keep filing transnational class actions and
defense counsel are likely to keep opposing them."222  Not all
transnational class actions involve foreign-cubed or foreign-squared
claims, and Morrison did not modify the approach courts have used
for years in determining whether foreign courts would recognize the
judgment in cases involving multinational classes where the defense is
unable to successfully challenge subject matter jurisdiction. In the
post-Morrison era, courts will still have to grapple with difficult
questions of foreign law when determining whether the foreign courts
would recognize an opt-out class action judgment. My proposed
solutions - excluding foreign class members in cases where the res
judicata effect of a class action judgment in the foreign country is
unclear, and considering the adequate remedies abroad as a further
justification to exclude foreign class members - should serve to shift
more of this transnational litigation out of U.S. courts. In addition,
like the Morrison rule, my proposed solution will be predictable and
efficient in implementation.
219. Id. at 2877-81.
220. Id. at 2886 (discussing this "transactional test").
221. See Warren Stern et al., F-Squared Claim Rejected, THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, Apr.
10, 2010, http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2010/04/10/f-squared-claim-rejected/.
222. Wasserman, supra note 3, at 2. Professor Wasserman also argues that
Morrison's impact may be of limited duration because Congress may legislatively
overrule it. Id. at 2 n.2.
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2. The Perceived Lack of Alternative Remedies Abroad
One argument against excluding foreign class members from
Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions is that there are not effective
remedies for the redress of mass claims in other countries.223 Thus,
the argument posits that foreign plaintiffs do not have access to any
procedural or substantive mechanisms for litigating these claims
abroad, and should not be excluded from U.S. courts on the basis of
hypothetical concerns about res judicata effect.224  Based on this
argument, not only would the foreign plaintiffs not have a chance to
seek redress abroad, but they would also not have a chance to test the
res judicata effect of a U.S. judgment.225 This argument is one of the
main justifications for one commentator's argument that there should
be a presumption in favor of including foreign class members in U.S.
class action lawsuits. 226
A full and exhaustive response to this concern is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, the conception of foreign plaintiffs,
particularly European ones, as not having access to effective group
litigation procedures may itself be overstated. Because many
countries have implemented group litigation procedures in varying
forms, European plaintiffs, if dissatisfied with the result of the
American litigation, may now have methods of bringing suit
elsewhere and testing the U.S. judgment or otherwise seeking redress
in foreign countries.227 Additionally, the Dutch Collective Settlement
Act, discussed supra, is another means by which foreign plaintiffs
could efficiently seek redress for their harms. 2' Thus, courts should
not lightly assume foreign plaintiffs have no access to means of either
testing the res judicata effect of the opt-out class action or achieving
223. Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1596-99; see also In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69
F.R.D. at 48-49 (noting that American form of discovery is unknown under foreign
law and that "[s]uccessful prosecution of this complex action, without discovery,
would be impossible.").
224. Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1596-99; In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. at
48-49.
225. Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1596-99; In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. at
48-49.
226. See Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1596-99.
227. See, e.g., Harbour & Northrip, supra note 27, at F-29 to -32 (discussing recent
increase of group litigation and class action-type procedures in Europe).
228. See discussion supra Section III.C.
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redress in their own countries.229
3. Under-Inclusive Plaintiff Classes
Another argument against excluding foreign class members,
grounded in the efficiency concerns considered by Rule 23(b)(3), is
that excluding foreign class members would lead to an "under-
inclusive plaintiff class." 230  These under-inclusive plaintiff classes
arguably minimize the regulatory effect of the class action, result in
less compensation to plaintiffs, and leave defendants facing
unresolved claims that might be brought elsewhere."'
This is, of course, a valid set of concerns that might justify
including more plaintiffs in a class. As to the first concern, nobody
would doubt that a larger class could generate more deterrent effect.
Similarly, it is uncontroversial that larger classes lead to more
compensation. Finally, the most inclusive class stops all future
litigation from occurring in all fora. This Article merely argues that
these values should not be pursued at the risk of relitigation because
other important values are at stake. For instance, with respect to
larger classes generating more deterrence, winning a case against a
larger class may also require more resources, but does not necessarily
mean the litigation ends if those plaintiffs can sue again in a foreign
country. The preclusive effect of the lawsuit is still a crucial
component of class actions and is not to be lightly disregarded for
the purposes of efficiency, deterrence, or compensation. Finally, with
respect to giving defendants closure (an end to litigation), the
defendants opposing the inclusion of foreign plaintiffs seem to accept
a lack of closure in exchange for avoiding relitigation. Thus,
preventing defendants from facing unresolved claims abroad does not
justify keeping foreign class members in the class with a risk of
nonrecognition.
IV. Conclusion
As litigation increasingly becomes transnational, courts must be
229. See Buschkin, supra note 23, at 1596-99 (arguing that foreign plaintiffs have
ineffective remedies). For a discussion of remedies in European countries, see
Harbour & Northrip, supra note 27, at F-29 to -32; Choi & Silberman, supra note 183,
at 485-88.
230. See Walker, supra note 31, at 770 (discussing under-inclusive plaintiff classes).
231. See id.
232. Buxbaum, supra note 5, at 31.
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sensitive to whether their judgments will be enforced abroad.
Unfortunately, in some cases, it is incredibly difficult to predict
whether a judgment will be recognized abroad. The results reached
in class certification decisions, where courts have considered whether
foreign courts would recognize a judgment, have failed to satisfy the
purposes of Rule 23 because they have inefficiently exposed the
parties to the risk of the judgment not being recognized.
To the contrary, excluding foreign class members where it is
unclear that foreign courts would recognize the judgment is a superior
solution that is both within the discretion of the district court and
consistent with the purpose of Rule 23. The case is even stronger for
excluding foreign class members when they are European. A growing
body of European law, particularly the Dutch Collective Settlement
Act, gives foreign plaintiffs adequate remedies abroad and exposes
neither party to the threat of future relitigation. Keeping foreign
class members in the class is not a superior method of adjudication
when there are effective remedies for foreigners abroad. When the
superior means of adjudication is abroad, plaintiffs should seek
redress abroad, not in a U.S. class action.
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